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This Essay explores a rush of restitution cases throughout the globe. The author sees in the
pattern formed by these cases a central component of a new international morality. The Essay
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author underscores the increasing way in which our histories shape our identities. Both realism
and tentativeness of the historical identity have become part of the growing liberal political space
that includes no longer merely Western countries, but has become attractive to numerous diverse





INTRODUCTION: HISTORY AS IDENTITY
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a sudden
rush of restitution cases all over the world. I see in the pattern
formed by these cases a central component of a new interna-
tional morality. These cases testify to a new globalism that pays
greater attention to human rights. Critics of these trends often
refer to the spread of a "victims culture." Instead I would like to
underscore the increasing way in which our histories shape our
identities. This truism is particularly applicable in the
postmodern and post-Cold War world, where an expanding
number of groups and nations recognize the malleable nature of
their own history, and based upon perceived historical rights ne-
gotiate with their victims over their shared political space. Both
realism and tentativeness of the historical identity have become
part of the growing liberal political space that includes no longer
merely Western countries, but has become attractive to numer-
ous diverse groups and nations globally.
This is most apparent in a world that shares vague liberal
political and moral commitments to individual rights as well as
to group human rights. This universe is studded with abundant
contradictions, but increasingly subscribes to a shared political
culture, which pays greater attention to history as a formative
political force.
In the past, history supposedly provided "objective" knowl-
edge of past events that were largely immune from reinterpreta-
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tion; history was the past and little could be done about it. More
recently history has been differently controversial, a largely fac-
tual (and relatively uninspiring) winners' history. Increasingly,
however, there is recognition of the growing elasticity of history,
and that it is anything but fixed. As history has become increas-
ingly malleable, it has simultaneously become more central to
political discussion. History informs identity more intimately to-
day, and being subject to reinterpretation, it has also become a
space for contesting perspectives. The new "we" of history are
both winners and losers. History changes who we were, not only
who we are. In this sense, history has become a crucial field for
political struggle. Yet the politics of memory, as it is often re-
ferred to, operate according to particular rules and tempo. For
a "new" history to become more than a partisan "extremist"
story, the narrative often has to persuade not only the members
of the in-group who will "benefit" from the new interpretation,
but also their "others": those whose own history will presumably
be "diminished," or "tainted," by the new narratives.
I. MORALITY
In understanding the role of history in contemporary polit-
ics we first have to empathize with the "moral imagination" of
the protagonists, and comprehend the manner in which their
perspectives of group identities impact international human
rights and frame the discussion of global politics. The ever-pre-
sent dilemma is the choice between global morality and local
sovereignty and identity.
Moral fervor has informed social reforms both as a religious
and a secular ideology. It is often the driving force of religious
movements and it played a similar role in broadly speaking
human rights movements, since the anti-slavery campaign.
World War I was a war to end all wars; Wilson's articulation of
self-determination was a principle, if not a policy. Similarly,
Roosevelt's four freedoms were an idealist moral call to arms.
The League of Nations was limited by infinite political haggling,
but the spirit was of pursuing higher moral goals. Similarly, the
United Nations ("U.N.") and its growing number of treaties and
conventions have imagined a more moral and orderly world
since the U.N.'s beginning. The rationale very often is moral,
not economic or pragmatically political. Human rights activists
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often anchor their ideology on a moral foundation. In a strug-
gle for a better world, these reform movements look to the fu-
ture. A somewhat different focus informs the restitution debate.
While the restitution movement justified its various demands by
calling on moral commitments, in contrast to other political
movements, however, it focuses on historical identity as a moral
constituent to amend the past.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF RESTITUTION
Let us look briefly at the historical record. I use restitution
as a cultural, a political, and a legal concept. This is in contrast
to enforced retribution-or 'punishment'-and to the age-old
custom of imposing war reparations. Traditionally, the winner
imposed various payments on the loser. The Versailles Treaty
(1919)1 postulated harsh terms for the losers. In public memory
the war indemnity levied upon Germany in 1919 caused (or at
least heavily contributed to) World War II. Politicians and schol-
ars strongly criticized the Versailles terms along Realpolitik lines
and viewed the policies of vindictiveness as a failure.2 Learning
from experience, in 1945 the Allies did not impose reparations
upon Germany. Instead, the United States accepted the burden
of rebuilding Europe and Japan and initiated the Marshall Plan.
This introduced a novel factor into international relations:
rather than holding to a moral right to exploit enemy resources,
as had been done previously, the victor underscored future rec-
onciliation and assisted its defeated enemies to re-establish
themselves. In hindsight the policy is widely celebrated.
Within this context of non-vindictiveness the modern con-
cept of restitution was born. Germany, acting on vaguely compa-
rable motivations of perceived international interests, but also
on its unique need to re-establish political and moral legitimacy,
sought to repent for its sins under Nazism by reaching an agree-
ment' with its victims.
1. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, (Ver-
sailles Treaty), June 28, 1919 reprinted in INSTITUTE OF INT'L AFF., THE GERMAN TREATY
TEXT 2-239 (1920).
2. See generally T.E. JEssOe, THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES: WAS IT JUST? (1942); JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 7-18 (1932); Harold Nicholson, Peacemaking
1919-A Critique, in THE VERSAILLES SETrLEMENT: WAS IT FOREDOOMED TO FAILURE? 17,
20 (Ivo J. Lederer ed., 1960).
3. Agreement Between Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel, Sept.
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Let me mention five quick points to illustrate the unique-
ness of the agreement:
1. The Germans paid compensation not to the winners but
to those they had victimized the worst: primarily the Jews.
2. The perpetrator compensated the victims on its own voli-
tion in order to facilitate self-rehabilitation.
3. This admission of guilt had to be done in concord with
the victims.
4. The restitution agreement was formulated between West
Germany and Israel, both 'descendant' entities of the
perpetrators and the victims.
5. The idea of compensation, the rhetoric of guilt, and lim-
ited recognition-forgiveness were translated, through the
legal medium of restitution, into new possibilities in in-
ternational relations.
Restitution in this sense is a political agreement driven by a
fuzzy moral view of justice regarding relations between national
groups in an attempt to amend historical injustices. It takes into
account pragmatic considerations, and can best be understood
as occupying a space between a moral aspiration and resignation
to political limitations. This ambivalence was obvious in the
agreement between Germany and the Jews in 1952. Following
1990, the credence of the moral framework of restitution was
challenged further.
III. HOW DO VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS NEGOTIATE
RESTITUTION AND HISTORICAL INJUSTICES?
Restitution for historical injustices is a new phenomenon.
In addition to the German-Jewish agreement, where victims and
perpetrators came face to face to barter the suffering and re-
sponsibility for the past and create a future, which both sides can
subscribe to, the post-colonial world provided another embry-
onic model.
This source for politics of restitution emerged from the
place of indigenous peoples in modern democracies, primarily
ex-British colonies. That is the United States, and even more so
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. In these countries, begin-
ning in the sixties, indigenous peoples won elementary civil
10, 1952 (Luxemburg Agreement) reprinted in NANA SAGI, GERMAN REPARATIONS: A His-
TORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 212 (1986).
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rights that expanded over time. These include various forms of
restitution of property, land, economic resources like fishing
rights, casino rights in the United States, and variations of af-
firmative action. The legal system had to change and more ex-
plicitly accommodate group rights. Overtime, political shifts in
each country led to changes of pace and at times even direction
in the attitudes of the state to the indigenous peoples, and the
achievements are noted for the frustration and disappointment
among activists. While the struggle continues, restitution re-
mains the major form of enabling indigenous peoples greater
equality.
The third force to underscore the centrality of moral con-
sideration in politics and the need to amend for historical
crimes was the civil rights movement in the United States. Af-
firmative action, never precisely articulated as reparation, was at
least in part viewed as compensation for historical injustices. It
included a welfare component, as well as a gesture to minimally
compensate for past discrimination. The language of restitution
however was not used.
Efforts to amend historical injustices bore fruit unexpect-
edly perhaps in the case of the Japanese Americans, who were
compensated in the late 1980s for suffering internment during
World War II. The success of this reparation campaign was very
implausible. It was done under a Republican administration
that did not pursue pro-minorities policies. It was at a time of
large budgetary deficits, when nobody was in the mood to spend
unnecessarily. Japanese Americans were not an important vot-
ing block. And yes, these were the days when Japan bashing was
a national pass time. Despite these factors, the compensation
was represented as a moral policy, as the right thing to do. Cer-
tain African Americans immediately asked that similar considera-
tions would be extended to them, after all, who deserve more
U.S. acknowledgment of its historical crimes than African Ameri-
cans?
The case of restitution for African Americans remains a
most profound challenge in American politics. As was evident in
the U.N. Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa
last September, this issue has global ramifications and involves
Africans and African descendants globally.
2001] RESTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL MORALITY S-51
A. Eastern Europe
There were largely two focal points in the post-1989 era for
the politics of restitution in East Central Europe: (1) those that
resulted from communist rule and (2) those that stemmed di-
rectly from unresolved World War II issues. In 1990, both had to
be part of the consideration.
The first category included the ex-communist countries' at-
tempts to address the complexities of a cascade of historical
crimes. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have strug-
gled with these issues perhaps more than other countries.
The second category involved such disputes as between Rus-
sia and Germany over the plundered cultural objects, the Swiss
handling of Nazi Gold, various insurance claims, and German
compensation and restitution for art plundered and for slave la-
bor.
One major challenge was sorting out "deserving" and "un-
deserving victims." In order to explore such possible demarca-
tion, we have to pose a larger question: Is there justified political
violence?
Under extreme war suffering and severe national destruc-
tion, politicians and public opinion seem to accept types of ac-
tions, which would otherwise be rejected as horrendous crimes
against humanity. Such were the strategic bombing or ethnic
cleansing during and in the aftermath of the war. In such cases,
inflicting extraordinary suffering is justified as a way to achieve
higher aims, specifically to stop worse crimes. The policies of
the Allies at the end of World War II are the best known exam-
ples for such collateral victims: those who were not implicated
directly as responsible nor participants in the crimes that were
being stopped through this extraordinary violence.
How are we to think of the collateral victims? Who are
these "undeserving victims" whose suffering has to be accepted
as part of the historical process? (It is hardly necessary to state
the relevance of this question these days).
Morally the very category of "undeserving victims" may be
offensive, especially to the victims and their descendants. Or
not. For the observer, historical context helps to sort out the
"deserving" from the "undeserving victims," and suggests a moral
yardstick, which may be applicable to contemporary conflicts
too.
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I would like to briefly talk about these issues in the context
of Central Europe and the legacy of the War.
In 1910 East Central Europe was the embodiment of Euro-
pean multiculturalism. Nationalism was a powerful force, but so
was the mosaic of ethnicities. Over the next eighty years, the
region was subjected to genocide, ethnic cleansing, revolutions,
fascist and communist dictatorships, and two world wars. While
the earlier period was hardly a Garden of Eden, it surely seems
so in hindsight.
With the fall of Communism each country sought to estab-
lish its own new, post-Communist identity. Restitution became a
focal point for these domestic debates. The dilemma was what
aspects of historical infliction should be reversed: personal suf-
fering-such as loss of freedom and other human rights
abuses-or property loss? Which of the historical constituencies
should be privileged and become the future identity of a coun-
try? Which, if any, ethnic or other groups decimated by the war
should be revived, for example: Jewish, German, the aristocracy,
or the church?
B. The Real Foreigners
The big losers in Eastern Europe were the ethnic minorities.
In the immediate post-Communist governments' drives to
construct priorities and strengthen cohesion in East Central Eu-
rope, present and past minorities were largely ignored. Across
the region, German, Jewish, and Roma minorities had existed in
different numbers, together with other minorities in specific
countries (Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia). The attitudes
towards these minorities underscored the moral economy of res-
titution. Historical, moral, and pragmatic considerations led to
dissimilar outcomes in the case of each minority.
The legal questions turned out to be the easiest to untangle
and served to manipulate political ends.
At one end of the spectrum were the Roma, who are per-
haps the clearest example that in East Central Europe, perceived
justice without economic interest or political power does not
lead to any restitution. On the other end of the spectrum were
the ethnic Germans, who were exiled from Eastern Europe after
the war.
Millions were driven to Germany. Those from the East
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spread throughout Germany, while those from the Sudeten set-
led in Bavaria. The former largely ceased to exist as a political
force, while the Sudeten Germans remain a significant political
pressure group. In the 1990s they reemerged on the interna-
tional arena, shaping the internal politics of the Czech Republic,
and its relation with Germany. They became the "Undeserving
Victims."
C. The Sudeten German-Undeserving Victims?
The suffering of German refugees in the aftermath of
World War II may appear indistinguishable from any other of
the period. Yet, it aroused the least compassion and created
minimal sympathy as political capital. In responding to the out-
cry of the suffering of the Sudeten refugees, the Czech argued in
the U.N. debate fifty years ago: "we have suffered more than
many delegates in this room can imagine."4 This quantification
of suffering explained, if not justified, the horrors of the war's
aftermath, and the refusal to recognize the German refugees as
victims.5
Of all of the World War II victims, it was, and remains, hard-
est to weep publicly for German suffering. Notwithstanding the
number of German refugees, they were viewed by the Central
European nations, not as victims, but as perpetrators.
Before and during World War II, the German minorities in
Central Europe often supported the Nazi invasion, and after the
war large numbers of Germans were expelled by Czechoslovakia
(2.5-3.5 million), Poland (1.5 million), and Hungary (500,000).6
They were part of the more than twenty million refugees of post-
war Europe. The refugees were often the lucky ones; many
others did not survive the war's onslaught and extermination.
In 1989 when the Sudeten Germans again raised their case,
Czechoslovakia largely shrugged it off. More than forty years af-
ter the fact, nobody was eager to explicitly justify the expulsion,
and certainly not the individual victimization. But the Czechs
4. MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE UNWANTED: EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 329 (1985).
5. Id. at 329-30; ALFRED-MAURICE DE ZAYAS & CHARLES M. BARBER, A TERRIBLE RE-
VENGE: THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF THE EAST EUROPEAN GERMANS, 1944-1950 (1994).
6. Marrus, supra note 4, at 330. See generally NATIONALE FRAGE UND VERTREIBUNG IN
DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI UND UNGARN 1938-1948: AKTUELLE FORSCHUNGEN (Richard G.
Plaschka et al. eds., 1997).
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viewed the Sudetens as responsible for their own fate. Public
opinion decried that, as representatives of the German atroci-
ties, these victims deserved neither restitution nor sympathy.
Was the late 1940s expulsion an appropriate and legitimate retri-
bution? Against their better judgment, Germany and the Czech
Republic were to feud over the fate of the Sudeten Germans for
the next decade. Exploring the legacy of the Sudeten expulsion
underscores the primacy of moral economy over legal considera-
tions in the politics of restitution.7
At issue is the juxtaposition of the Sudeten German claim to
restitution for their expulsion, and the Czech counterclaim re-
garding the lack of German compensation to Czechoslovakia.
The Sudeten Germans demanded that the Czechs recognize
their right to a homeland, namely to return to Bohemia and
other regions, and that they be allowed to build a community
with minority rights. This, they claim, would restore the pre-war
situation. The Sudeten Germans emphasize their demand for a
restored community and not just individual rights. The individ-
ual rights of free movement and equal citizenship, which was
forthcoming as part of the anticipated Czech membership in the
European Union, would not have been enough. Rather, their
demand was that Germans returning to the Czech Republic be
treated as an old minority, instead of merely recently arrived im-
migrants.
The Sudeten Germans view the repeal of the Munich Agree-
ment' of 1938 and the return of the Sudeten lands to Bohemia
as accomplishing a return to the status quo ante which could not
be completed without restitution. This limited view of what con-
stitutes a revocation of the Munich Agreement, and the return
to the status quo ante may not be shared by those who view the
war as the major catastrophe that resulted from that disastrous
agreement. The German emphasis is that only by achieving res-
titution of national minority rights would the moral and psycho-
logical stigma of the collective punishment inflicted by the
Czechs in 1946 be alleviated. In the meantime, property de-
mands lurk in the background, left for a later stage in the negoti-
7. Bradley F. Abrams, Morality, Wisdom and Revision: The Czech Opposition of the
1970s and the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, 9 F.AST EURO. POL. & SOCIETIES 234-55
(1995).
8. Munich Pact, Sept. 29, 1938, F.R.G.-Great Britain-Fr.-Italy, available at http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/munich 1 .htm.
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ation.9
German officials tried to evade formally recognizing the
German Sudeten responsibilities in cooperating with the Nazi re-
gime, and attempted to establish a parity of victimization be-
tween the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans. When apologizing
to the Czechs, both German President Roman Herzog and
Chancellor Helmut Kohl said that Germans ask for forgiveness
and want to forgive.
Yet, the Czech response to the Sudeten German demands
has been ambivalent. While refusing restitution as such, Czech
leaders have, at certain moments, acknowledged the injustice of
the mass expulsion, and recognized it as Czechoslovakia's moral
responsibility to correct. Vaclev Havel accepted in principle the
notion of the collective guilt as immoral, and condemned the
expulsions. He called this injustice the "greatest immoral deed,"
adding that the expulsions "caused not only the Germans but
possibly to an even greater degree also the Czechs themselves
moral and material damage."' By recognizing that the perpe-
trator's integrity is injured, Havel both validated the victimiza-
tion and claimed a part of it.
Yet in the calculus of moral economy, even the most liberal
and conciliatory Czechs view their nation as a victim of the up-
heaval, worse off than the expelled Germans. Because of Czech
ambivalence, as well as the German economic power and the po-
litical potency of the demands by the Sudeten Germans in Ger-
many, the diplomatic maneuvers by the Czechs have been preca-
rious and the official exchanges between the two countries were
far more constricted than would be expected.
The Sudeten Germans' continuous intervention in the
Czech privatization process, calling it a "provocation" and a "hos-
tile act," coupled with their rejection of compensation for Czech
victims of Nazism and their pressure to reject the German-Czech
friendship treaty, did not make negotiations easier. Nor did it
endear their case to the Czechs. By 1993, the German govern-
ment was implying that a resolution of the Sudeten issue would
9. The Sudeten German Landsmannschaft was quoted as demanding 160 billion
Deutschmarks in compensation. CTK NATIONAL NEWS WIRE, Jan. 23, 1996.
10. Profile of the Sudeten German Problem, CTK NATIONAL NEWS WIRE, May 30, 1995
(reporting that German President Richard von Weizsacker, on December 22, 1989,
quoted from a letter from Vaclav Havel sent in early November).
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be a precondition for Czech integration into Europe. Restitu-
tion became a potential showdown.
The rhetoric testified to the nature of the negotiations; it
was not intended to persuade the adversary of the justification of
one's claim, and hardly to advance compromise. Rather, it was
directed at domestic political gains. In the meantime, the
Czechs embarrassed the German government by restituting
20,000 victims of the Nazis, including 3,000 Jews who, because
they were not refugees, and therefore, did not fall within the
international definition of victims, were never eligible for Ger-
man reparations. (For the same reason, the surviving Czech Jews
were ineligible for reparations under various German-Jewish
agreements.)
The Sudeten German self-perception as victims led them to
ignore any role they may have had as a cause of World War II,
either by supporting the Nazi regime or as beneficiaries from the
occupation. In comparing the war's infliction on the Czech Re-
public to the damage to Germany and the German people, the
Sudeten Germans argue that the Czechs have suffered less.
They claim not only that the Czechs suffered very little material
damage, but that the Nazi policy of building up Bohemian in-
dustry actually benefited the Czechs.
Reciprocal calculation, say the Sudeten Germans, would
only benefit them. This unrepentant position, which views the
Sudeten Germans only as victims and ignores their role in sup-
porting the Nazis and profiteering from the 1938 expulsion of
Jews, is clearly targeted for internal Sudeten consumption and
could never amount to a serious effort to find a common
ground. For the Sudeten Germans, the only just restitution
would be German self-determination in Bohemia and the return
of property.
Political changes in Germany have largely brought the dis-
pute to an end. Yet, the rhetorical insistence on both sides sug-
gests that nothing of the conflict's poignancy has abated. Both
sides see themselves as victims and are adamant in rejecting their
protagonist's position. The details of the negotiation, which we
cannot get into here, were a fascinating illustration of how the
moral frame trumped legal and even pragmatic political consid-
erations. The most salient point was "who was the victim?" and
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the Czech public, aside from Havel and a small minority, could
find very little sympathy for the affluent ex-refugees in Bavaria.
D. Innocent Perpetrators
If the Sudeten Germans were viewed as undeserving victims,
the moral fuzziness increases when we consider the question of
the Russian plunder of art.
Following Russia's 1992 disclosure of the Trophy Art in its
possession, including the numerous masterpieces, hundreds of
thousands of art objects, a couple of million books, the image of
a new Ali Baba's cave was created. By 1995, with major exhibits
mounted in Leningrad and Moscow, the (re)discovery of the
looted art has become, perhaps, the most important cultural
event of the Nineties.
The discovered treasures raised the dilemma of who owns
the art. The intense politicking in this regard, in Russia and to a
lesser degree in Germany, captured the public imagination. Ini-
tially, a moral resolution to the ownership question seemed de-
sirable and feasible but the window of opportunity quickly disap-
peared under political pressure, and with it, the moral certitude.
The general story has become well known. While liberating
Eastern Europe from the Nazis at the end of World War II, the
Soviet army engaged in retribution against Germans and Ger-
many. And there was much to avenge.
Today it is hard to regard the transfer and relocation of
trainloads of treasures under horrendous conditions which
sometimes caused a great deal of damage, with any of the hero-
ism that was widely depicted by those in the Soviet Union who
performed it. How are we to think of the pillage? Should the
Soviet plunder be understood and legitimized in retrospect?
Understandably observers are queasy when faced with the
demand to arbitrate ethically between validating either Soviet in-
justices or German claims. The German-Russian dispute is con-
structed as a national rivalry over national art treasures. The na-
tional essentialism imposed upon the Trophy Art is especially
noteworthy because most of the art is actually European in ori-
gin and lacks any explicit national symbols for either country.
Germany, for example, demanded the return of art objects
taken by the Soviets regardless of their origin, including art
which was previously seized by the Nazis from other locations in
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Europe, particularly Dutch and privately owned art. Conversely,
from the Russian perspective there is little that can be called
Russian by any definition because much of the Russian art was
destroyed. Yet, in both countries national pride is projected
onto these treasures as though these objects are imbued with the
national identity.
The Soviet Army's atrocities against the occupied civil popu-
lations at the end of the war have been the subject of criticism
for many years. The question is: Whether the 1945 plunder
ought to be condemned as part of these atrocities, or as legiti-
mate restitution? This raises a larger question: Are there, or
ought there be certain instances in which ordinary moral consid-
erations are suspended in favor of a "locally moral, legitimate"
revenge? There are excellent reasons to assert that no revenge
can ever be considered legitimate. Those who hold such an hon-
orable position would find it hard to empathize with any of the
parameters of this debate. For those who privilege a more con-
textual approach to morality, the debate could present a signifi-
cant challenge. Even those who entertain the possibility of a le-
gitimate, limited revenge under national pain, as certainly was
the Russian position in 1944-45, face the perplexing dilemma of
choosing a criterion by which to evaluate such actions, either at
the time or a generation later. How are such relative historical
(in)justices to be evaluated? Should actions, which happened a
generation ago, be judged wrong or immoral with the passage of
time? The answer may depend on the context one chooses.
IV. DEBATE IN THE NINETIES
The West, as well as the Russian public, first learned of the
existence of the plundered art in 1991. The initial enlightened
impetus, both in Russia and the West, was to return the art. In-
deed, naming all of it "plundered," left little room for moral
questioning. After all, how could plunder be moral? In those
early post-Communist "euphoric" days, even unofficial and "pri-
vate" restitution was attempted. Several librarians even volun-
teered to send back collections that were kept under their super-
vision.
Yet opposition in Russia to returning the art led to debate
and re-assessment of the controversy. The only way one can give
serious credence to the notion of plunder-asjustice is by recog-
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nizing the dissonance between historical and contemporary jus-
tice. This predicament is shaped by: 1) the role of national cul-
tural politics, 2) the historical memory in both countries, and 3)
the relative wealth and potential of German reparations to Rus-
sia.
The Russian response initially split along the liberal reform-
ist and the conservative nationalist line. On one side stood the
reformists who, in the Russian tradition, are "Westerners" be-
cause they appeal to Western values. On the polarized side
stood the nationalists, the slavophiles, who reject those stan-
dards. Russian history informed both camps: the first impulse
of the reformers was to restitute the art. For Russians who advo-
cate stronger connections to the West, returning the art would
provide a golden opportunity in support of Russia's emerging
role in the West. For the slavophiles retaining the art was restitu-
tion for the lost Russian art. The West's initial response followed
predictable lines. There was little doubt as to which Russians
should be supported: on one side were the liberal reformers, on
the other side were the xenophobic, anti-Semitic, nationalists.
The implicit context was: "If the Russians had behaved in
Germany the same way the Germans behaved in Russia, the
problem of restitution would not exist." This disparity, where
Germany has nothing to restitute, placed Russia at a seeming
disadvantage.
To the degree that Germany has come to terms with its re-
sponsibility for the Nazi war crimes, it has done so gradually and
under pressure. Its continuous negotiations with Jewish repre-
sentatives introduced a culture of national repentance but even
this recognition was slow and partial. Due to the Cold War, Ger-
many has had neither reason nor opportunity to participate in a
similar public discussion regarding its obligations to Russia. The
art dispute could have provided such an opportunity if Germany
had rethought its obligations to Russia rather than merely isolate
the art dispute and hide behind national self-righteousness.
Today, the raw pain and anger directed at Germany have
largely subsided, which makes it hard to empathize, in hindsight,
with the actions by the Allies; actions which challenge our cur-
rent moral convictions. Towards the end of the war procedural
justice in Eastern and Central Europe was either set aside or re-
shaped to suit the international community's embrace of a
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higher, if inexplicable, justice. The actions of 'moral' retribu-
tion included international agreements to expel millions of peo-
ples across borders because of their ethnicity. The expulsion of
ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, for example, was inflicted
upon many Third Reich collaborators, but equally so upon mil-
lions of innocent individuals. At that time, this form of "ethnic
cleansing"-as similar ethnic expulsions have become known-
was not considered a crime. Rather, it was done according to an
international agreement with little or no protest, as we men-
tioned regarding the Sudeten Germans. This was justice
through retribution. It is a type ofjustice to which nations over
generations have succumbed, but which can hardly be justified
in hindsight. Nonetheless, it was hard to oppose it at the time,
especially when faced with the millions of survivors and the pain-
ful memories of those who were subjected to the military brutal-
ity, the genocidal policies, and the general suffering of the war.
V. SWITZERLAND AND NAZI GOLD: GUILTY BYSTANDERS
Switzerland's neutrality during World War II made it attrac-
tive to Jewish refugees as a country in central Europe in which
victims fleeing the Nazi regime's gas chambers and reign of ter-
ror could find safe haven. Over 20,000 Jews found refuge in
Switzerland in the years just prior to, and just after, the begin-
ning of World War II. Other managed to deposit their hopes
and savings in Swiss banks. After the war, agreements led to cer-
tain financial transactions, which supposedly took care of balanc-
ing the books, and giving whatever money was there to the Allies
and the survivors. Switzerland remained a beacon of civility in
the midst of savaged Europe. This picture remained throughout
the Cold War as Switzerland maintained its allure as neutral
ground for unsavory politicians, illegal political acts, and dirty
money. In polite company this was the face of morality. And
most importantly, this is how the Swiss viewed themselves. The
dispute has shaken the Swiss self-image, which is founded on the
self-perceived "humanitarian traditions of Switzerland."
The fact that while Switzerland accepted Jewish refugees,
over 30,000 other Jews were turned away, often only to find
themselves on their way to the extermination camps and hidden
from Swiss memory. Similarly hidden was the Swiss profit from
handling German money and gold and the crucial services they
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provided to the Nazis. Swiss banks also became the repositories
for the victims' property through Nazi confiscation. All that and
much more remained repressed.
Switzerland was not alone in this; other countries were im-
plicated in similar acts.
Especially since 1996, questions regarding the precise
knowledge and action of other neutral, conquered, and even Al-
lied countries during the war have become central issues for do-
mestic policies. Several have set up special commissions to inter-
nally examine their own history and conscience.
The Swiss, however, have become the focus.
The dispute over the Nazi gold, as these treasures have
come to be known, addresses issues of guilt and morality by ques-
tioning Swiss behavior during and after the war, as well as the
specter of anti-Semitism raised by the country's response during
the crisis of 1996-97. The Swiss were taken aback by the negative
international publicity and while internally debating their own
national morality, they mounted a defense of the virtue of neu-
trality which they claimed guided their war policies. Yet, it was
significant that although much of the criticism was focused on
the post-war policies and actions of the banks, there was little
defense of these post-war activities. The Swiss did not defend the
specific accusations but broadened the dispute into a question of
national defense and pride. Both external critics and defenders
have accentuated the dispute as it became a struggle for histori-
cal identity. The dispute was exacerbated by the magnitude of
the treasure in contrast to the fate of the small number of surviv-
ing victims. Personal stories were juxtaposed to the allure of fan-
tastic sums, the existence of which was asserted, investigated, and
fueled by the banks' slow and piecemeal admission of "discover-
ing" a few more millions here and there, as well as by their ques-
tionable practice of not responding to individual inquiries over
the years. According to this revisionist history, Switzerland is
viewed, by its critics as a Nazi accomplice, guilty of prolonging
both the war and the Holocaust itself.
At a certain level, the demand for justice has been long
standing, but Swiss banks had successfully fielded this demand in
an orderly and official, if obstructionist, manner. In the mid-
nineties, however, Jewish demands for justice were taken seri-
ously and were exceptionally productive, initiating an unprece-
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dented global exposure of an embattled national conscience re-
garding historical (almost distant) issues.
Why did such a historical catharsis/witch-hunt erupt in the
nineties? Where did the Swiss go wrong? How could a country
which had rarely been in the news suddenly be propelled onto
the front page and receive an intense public relations scolding
for doing what it has always done best: keeping information
about its banking industry inaccessible to the public? All politics
is local and the answer to these questions must be investigated in
the Swiss context. But beyond the local looms international mo-
rality. As was exposed a short while later, many other nations
had acted similarly and the Swiss investigations reverberated to
those other countries in what became an international historical
self-investigation; a litmus test of each contemporary society's
view of its own history and morality during and after the war.
There were several important reason for the timing of the
dispute. The foremost was the end of the Cold War and the de-
cline in the Swiss role as a theme park for international corrup-
tion. Secondly was the internal American and Jewish politics,
both of which facilitated politicians who aimed at exploiting the
situation. The increased visibility of restitution made it an attrac-
tive proposition for those politicians and lawyers. But these am-
bulance chasers are always there; their focus was directed to Swit-
zerland because it became vulnerable. This was particularly true
as the Swiss bungled their responses: the dissonance between
the Swiss self-perception as a moral nation, and their actions,
which left them susceptible for such pressures. Eventually the
Swiss chose to attempt to match their actions to their public
moral reputation and not to give up on the humanitarian legacy.
This is basically the domestic dispute in Switzerland: to claim
that this is business as usual, and deny the moral claims of the
victims, or to try and address these concerns. The latter seems to
have won, for now.
CONCLUSION
Drawing on the discussion of restitution, I attempt to out-
line even broader conclusions regarding the role of morality in
international relations. War and conquest have always led to
crimes and injustices by one group against another. Yet, while
international morality is an ancient topic, the discussion of inter-
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national moral commitments has assumed new vigor in the post-
Cold war world. In this context, public awareness of crimes
against humanity committed by governments are increasingly
translated into a political force. The abhorrence of such viola-
tions of human rights has even become an acceptable motive for
national and international intervention in "domestic" politics,
and a rationale for war waged by regional and international or-
ganizations. No longer does the brute and immediate existential
security need of the country form the sole legitimate justification
or motive in formulating a foreign policy. Instead, opposition to
genocide, support for human rights, and the fear of being impli-
cated in crimes against humanity (even by inaction), have be-
come practical, not merely lofty ideals. These ideals increasingly
shape political decisions, and the international scene.
Although restitution spreads globally, it is not a catchall so-
lution to every conflict. In many cases it is not part of the politi-
cal agenda, and in other cases the parties have failed to reach an
agreement. Restitution is successful as far as it goes, and has pos-
sible appeal to other cases, but it is not a panacea. Restitution
does not apply in cases of transitional justice where the ruling
and victorious power determines the fate of the perpetrators
(whether through a war crime tribunal or a commission of rec-
onciliation).
In addition, we must point out that negotiations over resti-
tution fail at times. While we underscore the potential of restitu-
tion, we also must underline cases where restitution fails to bar-
ter memory, identity, and reparation. Such are the cases, be-
tween Germany and Russia, between Japan and China (Nanking
and more), or the very partial success in Eastern Europe.
